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ACCOUNTING FOR REAL ESTATE
BY KENNETH A. MOUNCE*
This article is "cohfined fo accounting for real eitate sicurities, that is,
interests in real estate held through real estate investment companies.
In the past the principal issuers of such securities have been (1) cor-
porations whose principal activity is investment in real estate, (2) real
estate investment trusts, and (3) real estate syndications, with one or
more general partners selling limited partnership interests. Because of
their importance in the development of real estate accounting the follow-
ing issues are the focus of discussion: investor financial statement needs
and differences between tax and financial accounting, investor needs for
public reporting, the conflict between financial reporting for the real es-
tate developer and the real estate investor, the depreciation-appreciation
dilemma, and the accounting problems of projection presentation for real
estate securities.
Investor Financial Statement Needs and Differences Between Tax and
Financial Accounting
The investor financial statement needs for real estate syndications have
for the most part been limited to annual tax return information, and
quarterly and annual information as to sources and uses of each including
income, financing, expenses, debt service, capital expenditures and dis-
tributions. Because of these limited needs, the accrual basis of account-
ing, such as required by generally accepted accounting principles, has
not been required by typical investors in a real estate syndication, and
because the accrual method is not necessary for tax purposes, tax and
financial reporting in many cases have been on the same basis. Thus
independent public accountants have developed reports which render
opinions only on the manner of accounting used.' It can be presumed,
however, that the investors have wished to be informed by disclosure
whenever accrual adjustments for accounts receivable and payable and
accrued liabilities varied from accruals that would arise solely from
month-to-month typical trade and payment terms, that is, when liabili-
ties, particularly debt service, were delinquent or revenues were delin-
quent in collection beyond usual experience.
Where public trading or wide ownership is expected (for corpora-
* Partner, Arthur Andersen & Co.
'AICPA, COMM=I'rE ON AUDITING PROCEDURES, STATEMENTS ON AuDrIING PRO-
CEDURE No. 33, AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, ch. 13 (1963). AICPA, STATE-
MENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS § 620.05 (1973).
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tions, real estate investment trusts, and some real estate syndications),
the need for financial reporting to the participants or shareholders in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (whatever
their deficiencies in fairly reporting financial position and results of
operations) clearly has been imposed. A product of this need has
been what is referred to as "two sets of books" since tax reporting sel-
dom is wholly in conformity with generally accepted accounting prin.-
ciples.
The most common accounting difference is the use of the cash basis
of accounting for tax purposes as permitted by the Internal Revenue
Code 2 while using the accrual method of accounting for financial report-
ing purposes as required by generally accepted accounting principles.'
The essential difference in the two methods of accounting is that accounts
receivable and prepayments and accounts payable and other accrued lia-
bilities are not reported under the cash basis.
The cash method is commonly used for tax reporting purposes be-
cause of its inherent flexibility as to ihoice of taxable year for reporting
revenues and expenses-particularly with respect to prepaid expenses
-by control of cash receipts and disbursements. This shifting of rev-
enues and expenses from one year to another is subject to limitations of
distortion. For example, in response to abuses arising from the deduc-
tion of prepaid interest, the Internal Revenue Service has taken the po-
sition that the cash method taxpayer who pays interest in advance for a
period extending more than twelve months beyond the end of his cur-
rent tax year must deduct this amount ratably over the tax years in-
volved.' Interest paid in advance for a period not in excess of twelve
months following the end of the current tax year may be deducted by
a cash method taxpayer in the year paid, if the deduction does not give
rise to a material distortion of income. In addition, certain items such
as sales and purchases of inventory, depreciation, and bad debts are re-
ported on an accrual rather than a pure cash basis. Hybrid methods,
that is, part cash-part accrual, may be used if they fairly reflect income
for tax purposes.5 Whatever method is' chosen as being most repre-
sentative of income for the reporting entity, the method used for tax
purposes should be recorded on the books."
2INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 446(c)(1). [Hereinafter cited as CODE].
3 ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, STATEMENT No. 4, BASIC CONCEPTS AND Ac.
COUNTING PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISIE1S
para. 35 and 121 (1970).
4 Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 76.
5 CODE, § 446(c).
(;CODE, § 446(a).
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Another important difference is the ability to utilize installment gain
reporting for tax purposes, although generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples discourage its use unless realization problems are present Cur-
rently, the best guidance for the use of the installment method of
accounting for financial reporting purposes may be found in two Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants accounting guides.8 For
tax purposes, a sale of real property with no payments in the year of
sale, or payments aggregating 30% or less of the selling price (adjusted
for imputed interest, if necessary) in the year of sale, may permit indi-
vidual election as to the use of the installment method. In most cases,
payments of from 10%c to 25c of the sales value would cause the sale to
be recorded on a full recognition basis for financial reporting under gener-
ally accepted accounting principles even though the sale might be
treated as an installment sale for tax purposes.
Other statutory elections are permissible for tax purposes with re-
spect to interest, taxes, and certain other carrying charges. The taxpayer
may elect to expense or capitalize these costs for tax purposes either by
year for land parcels or by project for development projects? For finan-
cial reporting, these costs must be consistently treated one way or the
other, with the major support favoring a practice of capitalizing the costs,
subject to limitations of realizability in the sale or development.10
For depreciation charges, statutory elections for tax purposes may
permit the straight-line method or one of several accelerated methods,
subject to certain restrictions relating to depreciable real estate." New
commercial real estate may not be depreciated at rates faster than the 150
percent declining balance method; only the straight-line method is avail-
able for used commercial real estate. Residential rental property, how-
ever, qualifies for faster rates. New residential rental property may use
the double declining balance and used residential rental property may use
the 125 percent declining balance. For financial reporting, however,
depreciation may be on a straight-line basis; under full payout, net lease
circumstances, the annuity method; or any rational method that fairly
7 AICPA, ACCOU1TING PRINCIPLES BOARD, OPINION No. 10, OMNIBUS OPINION, p.m,.
12 (1966).
8 AICPA, COMMrrEE ON LAND DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES, ACCOUNTING FOR RETAIL
LAND SALES 6-9 (1973); AICPA, COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTING FOR REAL ESTATE TRANS-
ACTIONS, ACCOUNTING FOR PROFIT RECOGNITION ON SALES OF REAL ESTATE, pzas 8, 34
(1973).
9 CODE, § 266; Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1 (1959).
10 AICPA, COMM TTEE ON LAND DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES, £upra note 8, at pita. 51.
11 CODE § 167(j).
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presents income, including accelerated methods of different types. 12 The
methods elected for tax purposes do not have to agree with the methods
chosen as being most appropriate under generally accepted accounting
principles. These financial reporting requirements for depreciation are
frequently attacked as unrealistic for income reporting of real estate in.
vestments under generally accepted accounting principles; on the other
hand, the accelerated methods for tax purposes are zealously defended
by investors.
Particularly now that the new accounting guidelines as to completion
of the earnings process have been issued by the AICPA, 3 income recog-
nition may be slower for financial reporting than for tax purposes. This
slower income recognition pattern has been the case to some extent in
the past. For example, in sale/leaseback transactions, for financial re-
porting, gains are deferred for recognition over the period of the lease; 14
they are recognizable for tax purposes upon sale unless the leaseback
period is so long or repurchase options so favorable as to cause the In-
ternal Revenue Service to construe the transaction as a loan. 1
There is good logic for a difference in accounting. The basic pur-
pose of the tax law is to raise revenue in a fair manner and, by applica-
tion, to provide incentives for investment in areas Congress believes to be
in the public interest. The purpose of financial reporting, however, is
to provide financial information for decisions by management, creditors,
investors and others with interests of one kind or another in the busi-
ness.
The considerable variance in accounting practices in the area of real
estate investment, however, has been part of the reason for a significant
credibility problem that has plagued real estate investment and develop-
ment reporting for fifty years or more. Part of the reason for this credi-
bility problem has been the failure of accounting to reflect what many
people believe to be the real economics of the business and the economic
results of its operations. Generally accepted accounting principles de-
veloped around the short turnover working cycle of a commercial busi-
ness as it existed some generations ago, and admittedly, these principles
produce financial results that only infrequently report the real changes in
economic values. Thus a disparity arose between 'what most people want
12 AICPA, COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BUL-
LETIN No. 43, ch. 9C, para. 5.
13 AICPA, COMMITTEE ON LAND DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES and CoMMIiiBE ON Ac-
COUNTING FOR REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, supra note 8.
14 AICPA, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, OPINION NO. 5, REPORTING OF I1AS13S
IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF LESSEE paras. 19-22 (1964).
15 CODE, § 1031; Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c) (1956).
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in the way of reporting on the results of real estate operations and what
actually is reportable. As a result, many managers employed imagina-
tive accounting to bend the principles to the point where they broke.
Some undesirable results have emanated from the inability of many
to cope with the extreme complexity of the analytical requirements im-
posed by this accounting quagmire. For example:
(1) Real estate securities that probably should have sold have
proved difficult to sell.
(2) Real estate securities which are more "gimmicks" than invest-
ments have proved too easy to sell.
(3) The AICPA, which was then responsible for establishment of
accounting principles, was forced to issue, in much haste, badly overdue
guidelines. These did not correct the failure of the accounting model to
provide useful information, but merely rewove the fabric of existing reali-
zation principles to attempt to put an end to the recording of unrealized
profits.
(4) Most dismally, however, these accounting failures may have
actually caused bad management decisions aimed at attempting to report
favorably on operations at considerable economic cost to investors.
As an example, a real estate investment trust seldom takes accelerated
depredation on real estate because the operation of the tax laws would
cause its shareholders exposure to double taxation on return of capital
distribution and sale of property.10 The trusts, however, have trouble
competing in the marketplace for investors' funds without making such
distributions since they have reduced earnings to report; they may not
report distributable cash on a per share basis17 (the only basis probably
understandable to the average real estate security investor); and gener-
ally, therefore, they pay cash to demonstrate what they have actually
accomplished. (Even here, there is a large question whether such distribu-
tions are economically a return of capital, a matter that is not finally de-
termined until disposition of the property). Thus one of the most valu-
able attributes of property, availability of accelerated depreciation and
tax deferral, which is inherently related to it, is dissipated with no
compensation.
One positive step the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC) has
taken is to require reporting of the major differences between taxable
income and financial income.1 s Although the objections to this were
16CODED, § 312(m) (effect of accelerated depredation on earnings and profits); §§ 56-
58 (minimum tax), § 1250 (gain from disposition of certain depreciable reality).
17 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 142 (Mar. 15, 1973).
18 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 149 (Nov. 28,1973).
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considerable, a better disclosure of the specific reasons actually should
have considerable analytical benefit and make financial accounting more
credible by reason of increased understanding.
Inherent Investor Needs for Public Reporting
As noted above the untraded investment carries with it a relatively
low level of investor needs: his share of distributable income or loss
items for his tax return; a fair reporting of operating income and ex-
pense on the tax return method of accoulting and cash flow information
and a related "tax" balance sheet su that he may be satisfied with the
stewardship as to his investment; and information as to pending prob-
lems such as delinquencies in receipts and payments, claims by others
and so forth which could adversely affect his investment.
Where initial offerings of real estate are being made, however, the
potential investor requires additional information with which to evalu-
ate the effect his investment would have on his personal tax and financial
position. This would require, at a minimum, two levels of pro forma
information:
(1) Positive level-distributable cash expected from operations
and from disposition of the property and distributable taxable in-
come or loss if the investment works out as planned by the issuer.
(2) Negative level-cash requirements for maintaining debt
service, their source if cash from operations is insufficient to service
debt, and distributable tax profit (the "exit penalty") if the prop-
erty is permitted to revert to the lender at various times in the future
through default on the payment of indebtedness. The "exit penal-
ty" is the term given to the taxable income that is reportable where
property has been depreciated below the balance of indebtedness re-
lating to the property that is extinguished when the property is al-
lowed to revert to the lender. Most real estate syndications have
been built on a concept of providing tax deductions to the investor
in excess of the investor's contribution, of capital through the assign-
ment of tax bases to the investor interest attributable to nonrecourse
financing of the property.
Historical results of operations with pro forma adjustments provide
the basis for this type of information where operating properties with a
history are being offered, but only projections can suffice with respect to
properties without operating history.
"Blind pools" continue to present a problem since it is difficult to
project the unknown property; however, information about the sponsor's
(Vol. 35
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similar activities would seem appropriate, including the information that
he has not had any similar activities if that is the case. Some suggestions
have been made that expectations of the impact on investors of meeting
the investment objectives of the syndication might be useful, such as the
distributable cash and distributable taxable income or loss that is contem-
plated to be achieved from the investment objectives. It is important, if
this ultimately evolves as a requirement by securities regulators, that due
consideration also be given to providing the negative level of pro forma
possibilities if the investment objectives are not attained. Similarly, it
would appear that the investment objectives should cover the matter of
anticipated financing and its effect upon break-even levels with respect
to cash requirements within the partnership.
Where offerings involve guarantees or implied support of the pro-
moter, or adequate investment by the general partner to provide a "safe
harbor," the investor also needs information as to the financial position
and the results of operations of the promoter and the general partners.
Where the securities to be offered are expected to be traded or where
holdings are widely disseminated to less sophisticated investors, the in'
vestor information needs are much more sophisticated. They would
include, for instance, current information as to financial position, results
of operations, and changes in financial position reported in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles. Because of the limitations
of usefulness of financial statements prepared on the basis of generally ac-
cepted accounting principles, particularly as to reporting results of opera-
tions of real estate investments, the reporting of the changes in financial
position including the funds derived from operations of the property as-
sumes much greater importance. Indeed, to evaluate his interests, the in-
vestor really needs to know the funds available from operations and dis-
positions of property for distribution or re-investment with respect to his
pro rata interest, that is, per share or per unit, a piece of information now
precluded in SEC regulated securities.10
Unfortunately, one of the most important needs for the unsophisti-
cated investor also cannot be provided-the fair market value of his
interest in the properties. Unlike other regulated investment companies
where the rules require market value information," the real estate in-
vestment company is precluded by practice from providing this informa-
tion. (Oddly, no citation of authority is possible here. It is related to
Principle E-2' 1 which states "increases in assets rarely arise from external
19 Id.
2 0SEC Regulation S-X, Rule 6-02(b) "Valuation of Assets," 17 C.F.R. § 210.6-02(b)
(1973).
2 1 AICPA, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, STATEiENT No. 4, BASIC CONCEPIT AND
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events other than transfers"-in other words, on the transactional ori-
entation of the accounting model). The result of this lack of informa-
tion is that the investor is required either to ignore the problem, to try
to develop his own estimates from inadequate information or to use
other overall analytical evaluation techniques of doubtful result such
as cash distribution valuation, which is the predominant method used
by securities analysts.
The solution to his analytical need is to require valuation in reporting
for real estate securities under some kind of expertizing with liability,
or as an alternative, adequate reporting of information with respect to
operations of individual properties to provide a suitable basis for in-
vestor evaluation. This latter approach is somewhat likely to fall of its
own weight if only because of the vast amount of detail to be evalu-
ated if the entity holds a sizeable portfolio of properties.
Conflict Between Financial Reporting for the Real Estate Developer and
Real Estate Investor
Because the investor had so little knowledge of real estate investment
and risk, he tended to want as riskless an investment as he could nego-
tiate (or, at least, what he thought was riskless). This resulted in the
developer agreeing to transactions frequently involving one or both of
the following characteristics: (1) minimum cash investment by the
investor and settlement of the balance due the developer out of cash
generated by operations of the property and tax "savings" of the pur-
chaser, or (2) continuing involvement by the developer for various pe-
riods in providing cash to meet deficits in cash requirements, provide
guaranteed return to the investor, develop the property for the investor,
and protect the investment in other ways.
Similarly, some developers tried to be both developers and investors
for their shareholders. This dual role required imaginative accounting
to provide reportable income per share; alternatively, the developer
entity had to try to carry a message of "cash flow" per share as being
the significant analytical tool in lieu of earnings per share when talking
to analysts and investors.
The SEC responded to this message by issuing accounting series re-
leases to attempt to stop the possibly misleading presentations that
arose and to proscribe reporting "cash flow per share" or similar infor-
mation to investors. The AICPA reacted by issuing two accounting
guides to attempt to put income and profit-recognition reporting for
AccoUNTING PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSIN13SS NTIlR-
PRISES para. 187 (1970).
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land development companies and real estate developers and investors
back into the framework of realization principles under generally ac-
cepted accounting principles.
Accounting Series Release No. 95"2 lists nine circumstances which
tend to raise a question as to the propriety of current recognition of
profit: (1) evidence of financial weakness of the purchaser; (2) sub-
stantial uncertainty as to amounts of costs and expenses to be incurred;
(3) substantial uncertainty as to amount of proceeds to be realized be-
cause of the form of consideration or method of settlement; (4) re-
tention of effective control of the property by the seller; (5) limitations
and restrictions on the purchaser's profits and on the development or
disposition of the property; (6) simultaneous sale and repurchase by
the same or affiliated interests; (7) concurrent loans to purchasers;
(8) small or no down payment; and (9) simultaneous sale and leaseback
of property.
The objective of ASR No. 95 was not achieved since it tried to solve
the problem by describing a variety of factual circumstances, a combina-
tion of which created profit recognition problems, without describing
the thrust of the principles included and the accounting practices that
could be followed if these limiting circumstances existed.
Accounting Series Release No. 142"3 proscribes reporting "cash flow
per share" or similar information to investors on the ground that cash
flow data is not a substitute for or an improvement upon properly deter-
mined net income as a measure of results of operations.
The AICPA guides-4 tried to attack the matter by addressing two
principal issues:
(1) Levels of initial cash investment and continuing cash invest-
ment by the buyer necessary to result in a receivable of enough liquid-
ity and measureability to support use of the accrual (realization) pro-
cess. The guides further specify methods of accounting that might ap-
propriately be used if the levels of cash investment were initially (or on
a continuing basis) insufficient for total profit recognition at the time
of the initial transaction.
(2) Completion of the earnings process (the other element of the
realization principles), that is, the transference of the risks of owner-
ship and the completion of the seller's performance obligation to the
buyer. Once again, specified accounting was recommended where this
22 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 95 (Dec. 28, 1962).
23 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 142 (Mar. 15, 1973).
24 AICPA, CoMMn-rEE ON LAND DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES and COMUME ON Ac-
COUNTING FOR REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, supra note 8.
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either occurs at a single point in the future or progressively as perfor-
mance takes place in the future.
All these guidelines will affect real estate developer securities. Their
impact on real estate investment securities will be to limit the type of
transactions negotiable in acquisition of real estate and, for the real es-
tate investment entity, limit its reporting of profits from disposition of
property. Where the financial statements of the developer are required
in the issuance of investment securities, these statements may be affected
and thus indirectly affect the issuer. It would appear that these changes
will do little to promote the use of the developer-owner type of entity
since realization of income will occur only slowly from operations and
ultimate sale of property.
Depreciation/Appreciation Dilemma
Turning to the depreciation issue, one finds that operators of real es-
tate frequently do not discuss depreciation as being an economic charge
against earnings, and many question whether depreciation of real prop-
erty is a proper expense in determination of income from real property.
The value of any property, tangible or intangible, personal or real, is the
present value of the stream of income (or net cash proceeds) that can
be derived from it. The present value is determined by discounting
this income stream at the buyer's anticipated rate of return on invest-
ment.
Conventional straight-line depreciation (a concept of cost allocation,
not value representation), therefore, actually anticipates a dedlning level
of income. For example, using a 10-year anticipated income life, with
no salvage value, the straight-line allocation of cost, using a 10% return
assumption and a $100,000 investment, is rational only if net cash from
operations follows the approximate pattern below:
Net Cash After
Cost Recovery Return @ Operating
Period (Depreciation) 10%/Annum Expenses
1 $10,000 $10,000 $20,000
2 10,000 9,000 19,000
3 10,000 8,000 18,000
4 10,000 7,000 17,000
5 10,000 6,000 16,000
6 10,000 5,000 15,000
7 10,000 4,000 14,000
8 10,000 3,000 13,000
9 10,000 2,000 12,000
10 10,000 1,000 11,000
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Alternatively, if the income expectation is straight-line, the rational
depreciation (cost allocation) pattern is an annuity pattern. Using the
same investment as in the prior example but straight-line income:
Met Cash After
Cost Recovery Return a Operating
Period (Depreciation) 10%/Annum Expenses
1 $ 6,275 $10,000 $16,275
2 6,903 9,372 16,275
3 7,593 8,682 16,275
4 8,352 7,923 16,275
5 9,187 7,088 16,275
6 10,106 6,169 16,275
7 11,117 5,158 16,275
8 12,228 4,047 16,275
9 13,451 2,824 16,275
10 14,788 1,487 16,275
These are overly simplified examples, and the rationale for them
has been defined as an investor's level return on investment, but the
point is that real estate depreciation rationally follows the annuity pat-
tern only if income is straight-line. Income from real estate would more
nearly follow declining patterns (except for net leases) were it not for
inflation in values. That is, physical deterioration and increasing
maintenance; plus obsolescence would take their toll were it not for in-
flation in costs (thus increasing replacement cost) and limited land avail-
ability in a comparable location both of which may serve to keep net
rentals from declining or even cause them to increase. The evidence
of this may be observed from certain economic realities: (1) eventually,
property improvements finally deteriorate to the point where they must
be replaced; (2) in developments where the locational advantage is
lost, values may decline, not rise, with a resulting impairment of rental
capability; and (3) where developments are rendered obsolete through
design, new materials, and so forth, they no longer compete as effectively
for rentals.
A fair conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is that real estate
probably does depreciate on a pattern more nearly approximating the
straight-line pattern, but unrealized appreciation of the improvements
(through cost inflation) and land values (through locational demands)
is frequently taking place at the same time.
If depreciation permitted for tax purposes did not include at least
the straight-line method of depreciation, inequitable or unfair taxation
would result. That is, the taxing authorities would be taxing unrealized
appreciation of values if they allowed deductions only on a pattern that
permitted recovery of cost more slowly than recovery under the straight-
1974]
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line method. Furthermore, the fairness of depreciation deductions re-
captured at ordinary rates, except for accelerated deductions, is highly
questionable. The present Internal Revenue Code recognizes this'" al-
though many critics continue to assert that investors obtain an extraordi-
nary tax benefit from depreciation deductions.
This analysis also indicates that financial income reporting utilizing
straight-line depreciation of real estate improvements is not a reporting
deficiency under generally accepted accounting principles of realization;
it is a matter of the reporting process ignoring economic facts of aIppre-
ciation of value (and, at times, the loss of value).
The present inability of the accounting process to fairly reflect eco-
nomic facts, aided and abetted by a proscription of value information in
financial reporting, has had unfortunate ramifications:
(1) It continues to generate unwarranted discussions of tax re-
form with respect to depreciation practices for real estate.
(2) It has inhibited real estate development for ownership rather
than sale by inhibiting access to equity money in the public securities
markets.
(3) It has caused offerings of interests in real estate to be made to
unsophisticated investors on the basis of inadequate information and at
such a high level of front-end selling costs that it becomes highly ques-
tionable whether the value of the property is as high as the initial of-
fering price.
(4) It may well have caused the real estate development industry
to create more product than the market warranted.
(5) It has caused a possibility of misdirection of investors through
arrangements that disguise equity ownership by use of land leases, high
loan-to-value ratio loans and other techniques that try to accomplish an
income reporting pattern that follows the economic facts even though
that reporting does not disclose that much of the income is unrealized
appreciation.
Accounting Problems of Projection Presentation for Real Estate Securities
One of the more knotty problems in real estate reporting is projec-
tion presentation. Actually, no accounting problems in presentation of
projections exist. The conversion of assumptions into a financial pre-
sentation is a mathematical exercise that can be performed by anyone
with a limited mathematical ability or a computer with a properly de-
signed program. Classifications and presentations can be prescribed by
forms by the regulators, and the application of generally accepted ac-
25 CODE, § 1250.
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counting principles to the information can be based upon the method of
accounting to be used. Furthermore, the required assumptions are most
likely best prescribed by the regulators.
The problem with respect to projection information in real estate or
any other business activity always has been, and always will be, with the
assumptions utilized in the projections. As with any issue that deals
with the future, there is no way of knowing, short of guarantees by
third parties, that results will be as projected. Certain matters such as
tax results can be judged based on present knowledge, but they will ulti-
mately be determined by third parties who may be able to change the
rules. Furthermore, an offeror's projections will probably have an op-
timistic bias or the offering might not be practicable; therefore, more
realistic projections will likely produce satisfactory results only by edict
from regulators.
In the past, the independent public accountant's association with pro-
jections has been by disclaimer,"' that is, his report has said that the pro-
jections have been prepared to reflect the assumptions and estimates, but
since they relate to the future, he cannot express an opinion on them
or on how closely the projections may approximate the actual results.
The accounting profession has a credibility crisis arising primarily
out of the belief that accounting is a more exact science than it is and a
lack of recognition that accounting is merely .- communication system
built upon a considerable level of judgment. This raises a real question
whether it is appropriate for regulators and the public to ask the account-
ing profession to be associated with projections which are very likely
to be based on assumptions that will not be achieved. Furthermore,
considering that projections involve professional work by the indepen-
dent public accountant only if he assumes some responsibility for the as-
sumptions, the key question is whether he really is the best qualified to
undertake the responsibility. A higher level of economic forecast ex-
pertise exists outside the accounting profession than within it. In fact,
much of the profession's credibility problem on historical financial state-
ments lies in its inability to anticipate the impact of the future on the
historical statements, that is, asset valuation and reserves, or if not its
inability to anticipate that impact, its inability to impose its opinion on
that of its client.
Present proposals on the question of the independent public accoun-
tant's association with forecasts suggest an opinion somewhat along these
2G AICPA, RESTATEMENT OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 1972, Rule 2.04-
Forecasts: "'A member shall not permit his name to be used in conjunction with any foreast
of future transactions in a manner which may lead to the belief that the member vouches
for the achievability of the forecast."
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lines: (1) that the compilation agrees with the assumptions; (2) that
the presentation is in conformity with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples; and (3) that the assumptions are not unreasonable. There is
some delay in coming up with the definition of standards for determina-
tion of whether the assumptions are reasonable or not reasonable.
Another problem may exist if the accountant is to be associated with
projections: Can the historical position of independence of the account-
ing profession be maintained if the firm associated with the projections
is held to a financial responsibility with respect to assumptions, as well
as for later opinions with respect to the actual results of operations, when
the results may indict the initial assumptions? History indicates there
is a significant problem of the proper application of independent judg-
ment in reporting actual results of operations after projections have been
publicly disseminated with respect to projected or anticipated results.
Accounting involves many judgments to be made in the process of
trying to isolate income and related charges against income to account-
ing periods, particularly with respect to business .ycles which for real es-
tate may run out to the total life of real property. These judgments
affect such matters as the method and life assumptions for allocation of
charges for depreciation, reserves for collection losses on receivables,
valuation of liabilities paid over a long period of time, overhead capitali-
zation policies, obsolescence, and capitalization of carrying charges. These
judgments often have a significant impact on the reported results of op-
erations for any single fiscal period and on the financial position of a
business entity.
The independent public accountant exercises his judgment with re-
spect to these questions based upon examination of certain documen-
tary evidence and application of knowledge of general economic condi-
tions and their possible impact to be recognized in an accounting period.
Similarly, management of the entity, which has primary responsibility
for the financial statements, also makes its judgments, probably from an
even better position of being able to evaluate the impact of external
circumstances upon the internal affairs of the business. Nonetheless, in
the usual process of financial reporting by management and examina-
tion and reporting by independent public accountants, differences of
opinion arise with respect to these judgments and they are resolved in an
atmosphere fairly free of undue bias with respect to the results of the de-
cisions on the financial statements. Once the chief executive officer or
the chief financial officer has given information with respect to ex-
pected results of operations, however, particularly on a per share basis, a
significant bias is injected into the resolution of differences of judgment.
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The later judgments of management will be influenced by the desire on
their part to achieve performance relatively close to that predicted.
This bias causes the judgments to be made either favorably or unfavor-
ably to reported income as required to keep it within the area of projec-
tion.
While the independent public accountant may keep the effect of this
.bias within.bounds of reason on ar annual basis, jlhe small increments
of optimistic bias reflected in financial reporting often accumulate into a
difficult problem sometime in the future after several reporting periods.
The result of this has been what is frequently described as "big bath"
accounting. In a period when operating results are unfavorable, man-
agement takes the opportunity to clear the balance sheet of deferred
charges or unrecoverable or doubtful values so that they will no longer
constitute an impediment against the future. This will be an even
greater problem if the optimistic bias is now to be shared by the inde-
pendent public accountant who reports on the projections and later ex-
amines the financial statements reflecting actual results of operations.
The propensity for some investments to fail to meet expectations im-
poses a high degree of necessity for adverse as well as favorable projec-
tion information. This adverse information would include break-even
analysis, for example, at what level of rentals or excess expenses would
the cash generated be inadequate to service debt. A further type of ad-
verse information would be full exhibition of economic and tax effects
of foreclosure or relinquishment of the property at various points of time
in the future.
If third party expertizing on projections is considered desirable,
it would be appropriate to look to real estate economists and appraisers,
not the accounting profession. Even in these professional groups pres-
ent standards are probably not adequate as a basis for expertizing in
securities offerings.
Finally, if the regulators consider it expedient to involve the account-
ing profession, they should satisfy themselves that the profession has es-
tablished adequate standards for performance to reduce the discrepancy
between the profession's achievement and the expectations that the reg-
ulators, and the public, will have with respect to the profession's perfor-
mance. Furthermore, considerable study is required to determine if the
accounting profession has within its membership the competence to ex-
pertize on projections and, if it does, how this competence may be eval-
uated with respect to any given practitioner.
Considering the difficplties of getting satisfactory expertizing,
perhaps the first step should limit any presentation to the offeror's pro-
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jections, both favorable and unfavorable, and the assumptions used, and
permit the marketplace to assess the weight to be accorded to them. This
was the conclusion of the Financial Analysts Federation research proj-
ect on corporate forecasts.T
It would be desirable for those involved in the decisiohs ifi this area
to be mindful of a few matters with respect to projections, specifically:
(1) Any forecast will be wrong, inevitably.
(2) The degree of wrongness in the forecast and the resulting
consequences will depend on many factors, not the least of which is
luck.
(3) A wrong forecast may well lead to a bad decision-at least one
that results in an unsatisfactory investment when compared with ex-
pectations. The degree of wrongness and dissatisfaction similarly de-
pend on many things, not the least of which is luck.
(4) A dissatisfied investor turns increasingly to litigation for re-
covery and he is unwilling to admit that it is his ultimate responsibility
to make the forecast on which he makes his decision-that is the risk-
taker's function in investment markets. Consequently, projection infor-
mation in offerings might well be accompanied by clear indications that
the information is being provided only for the use of the prospective in-
vestor in making his projection as to future possibilities, etc., and that it
does not represent any indication of what actual results may be.
Summary of Accounting Requirements in Security Regulation
Smaller non-traded offerings that do not require continuing Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission reporting have generally been satisfac-
torily reported upon with tax-reporting-oriented statements with satis-
factory disclosures. The SEC offerings and traded securities, including
real estate investment trusts and real estate corporations, have been re-
quired to use financial statements prepared in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles. Many issuers have recognized that appli-
cation of these principles does not fairly reflect the results of real estate
operations. Their remedy often has. been to use accounting that de-
parted significantly from what accountants believed were appropriate
principles. This resulted in publication of:
(1) Accounting Series Release No. 95 by the SEC,
(2) Accounting Guide "Accounting for Retail Land Sales" by the
AICPA,
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(3) Accounting Guide "Accounting for Profit Recognition on Sales
of Real Estate" by the AICPA.
Some investment-oriented companies, unable to present .value infor-
mation, have attempted to overcome the problem by expressing results of
operations as "cash flow per share", "income before depreciation" or
some variant without common definition to give what they believe to be
more representative per share results, or they have been forced to pay
dividends out of capital with the following results:
(1) Accounting Series Release No. 142 by the SEC,
(2) Industry efforts to arrive at common definitions of funds avail-
able for distribution or reinvestment so that useful comparable informa-
tion may be provided investors.
Other investment-oriented companies and mortgage trusts have be-
gun to invest in land leases, high loan-to-value loans and other methods
of structuring investments aimed at avoiding depreciation charges against
income. This may cause a new round of credibility problems since it
may create liquidity problems and losses if depreciation is not adequately
offset by appreciation. Some attention is being given to recognition of
fee income, but this may only be the tip of the iceberg.
Some projections of operating results have been required or permitted
in real estate offerings, but such projections need a new discipline to
fairly present to the investor the possibilities of unsatisfactory perfor-
mance in his investment. The use of projections is also difficult for
"blind pool" types of offerings.
The real need for investor reporting is the clear presentation of sat-
isfactorily expertized value information subject to suitable standards
and the fair presentation of unrealized gains or losses. This approach,
however, has not been adequately studied. If a suitable basis for this
type of reporting could be developed, realization principles for income
recognition could be maintained on a strict basis, with the result that
credibility would return to this industry and investment decisions would
be based upon inherent economic considerations.
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